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ON THE ETHICS OF PAYING ORGAN DONORS:
AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
T Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman
INTRODUCTION
A severe and chronic shortage of cadaveric human organs available
for transplantation has persisted in the United States and other coun-
tries for more than three decades. During that time, more patients
have been added to transplant waiting lists each year than have been
removed as a result of a successful transplant or death.' As a conse-
quence, the waiting lists continue to grow, expected waiting times in-
crease, and the number of patient deaths on the lists rises. Today,
there are approximately 90,000 patients on official transplant waiting
lists, and more than 6,000 of them have died each year for at least the
past four years as a direct consequence of the organ shortage. 2
In the meantime, considerable debate has occurred about how best
to resolve that shortage. That debate has spawned dozens of articles
and books advocating a variety of modifications to our current organ
procurement system-modifications that are intended to increase the
number of organs collected.3 Several of the proposed policies have
been implemented, both in the United States and abroad, with varying
degrees of success.4 To our knowledge, however, none of these poli-
cies has succeeded in completely eradicating the organ shortage.
1. Much of the relevant data may be found at United Network for Organ Sharing, www.unos.
org (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
2. The number of deaths of patients on transplant waiting lists may either overestimate or
underestimate the number of deaths attributable to the organ shortage. On the one hand, some
of these patients would probably have died even if they had received a transplant. On the other
hand, some patients are not put on the lists because of the shortage. Also, some patients are
removed from the lists when their health deteriorates to the point that they cannot withstand the
transplant surgery. Deaths of patients in either of these last two categories are not counted.
3. For a survey of the relevant literature, see DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE
U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM (2002).
4. See, e.g., Alberto Abadie & Sebastian Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation on
Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross Country Study (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10604, 2004); Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, The United States Sys-
tem of Organ Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: "And
the Winner Is ... ," 20 J. CORP. L. 5 (1994); David E. Jefferies, The Body as Commodity: The Use
of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621 (1998); Melissa N.
Kurnit, Organ Donation in the United States: Can We Learn from Successes Abroad?, 17 B.C.
827
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
One policy option that has not yet been tried is the use of financial
incentives, or donor payments, to encourage an increased rate of con-
sent among potential cadaveric organ donors. Ironically, that is the
policy universally recommended by economists writing on this sub-
ject.5 Moreover, it must be recognized that a shortage is, by defini-
tion, an economic phenomenon. A shortage is defined as an excess of
the quantity of a good demanded over the quantity supplied at a given
price.6 Involving the distinctly economic concepts of supply and de-
mand, shortages of anything clearly fall within the bailiwick of stan-
dard economic analysis. Those interested in resolving a shortage,
then, should turn to economics for a solution.
One of the most fundamental propositions of microeconomics is
that shortages are caused by prices held artificially below their equi-
librium, or market-clearing levels.7 As a result, shortages can gener-
ally be resolved in a straightforward manner simply by allowing price
to rise to its market-determined value. For at least the past two de-
cades, economists, recognizing this fact, have proposed paying organ
donors as a direct method to resolve the organ shortage. Indeed,
every economist who has written on this subject has reached precisely
the same conclusion-the organ shortage is caused by the legal ban on
donor payments and can be resolved successfully by eliminating that
ban.
That proposal, however, has met considerable resistance, primarily
in the form of a set of alleged ethical objections. 8 In the meantime, as
the debate on this subject has proceeded, something on the order of
50,000 patients have lost their lives, arguably as a direct result of the
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405 (1994); L. Roels et al., Three Years of Experience With a 'Presumed
Consent' Legislation in Belgium: Its Impact on Multi-Organ Donation in Comparison With Other
European Countries, 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 903 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Andy H. Barnett et al., A Market for Organs, Soc'y, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 8, re-
printed in ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMICS: BRIGHT IDEAS FROM THE DISMAL SCIENCE 89 (Al-
exander Tabarrok ed., 2002); L. Dwayne Barney, Jr. & R. Larry Reynolds, An Economic
Analysis of Transplant Organs, ATLANTIC ECON. J., Sept. 1989, at 12; Roger D. Blair & David L.
Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 403 (1991); Marvin Brams, Transplantable Human Organs: Should Their Sale
Be Authorized by State Statutes?, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 183 (1977); Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the
Supply of Transplantable Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1989).
6. See ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. ToUtiSON, MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE MAR-
KETS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 67 (6th ed. 2000), or virtually any principles of economics text.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaveric Organs
for Transplantation, 311 NEW END. J. MED. 981 (1984).
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success those objections have had in preventing the adoption of the
proposed donor payments. 9
Given the likely ability of donor payments to resolve the shortage
and the extreme cost in human lives of failing to resolve it, one would
think that the arguments to date that have forestalled the use of pay-
ments would be grounded solidly upon a set of clear and convincing
logical propositions supported by a substantial body of empirical evi-
dence. One would be sadly mistaken.' 0 Instead, a review of the liter-
ature in this area reveals a series of statements, claims, and superficial
"ethical" arguments that, upon any sort of close inspection, are uncon-
vincing at best, and at worst just plain nonsense."a The arguments are
either logically invalid or founded upon unstated, untested, and un-
realistic assumptions regarding what are, at heart, empirical questions,
such as the price elasticity of cadaveric organ supply.12
Here, we review and rebut some of the more common ethical argu-
ments that have been employed-successfully so far-by opponents
of donor payments. Following that critical review, we present a more
straightforward approach to this issue using the traditional cost-bene-
fit methodology of economics. We are certainly aware of and agree
with the view that ethical or moral issues cannot be resolved on the
basis of a cost-benefit analysis alone. At the same time, however, we
do not believe that important public policy questions can be answered,
or ethically evaluated, in the absence of this sort of information. 13
Moreover, given the demonstrated illegitimacy of most, if not all, of
9. Waiting list deaths for kidney, liver, and heart patients are reported for the period
1988-1998 in KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 3, at 17, 24, 25.
10. In evaluating the ethical objections to paying organ donors, Radcliffe Richards wrote:
"People do not resort to arguments as bad as these unless they think arguments are badly
needed." Janet Radcliffe Richards, Nephrarious Goings On: Kidney Sales and Moral Arguments,
21 J. MED. & PHIL. 375, 406 (1996).
11. One commentator has gone so far as to state that donor payments would undermine "the
nobility of the medical profession." See Francis L. Delmonico, Exchanging Kidneys-Advances
in Living-Donor Transplantation, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1812, 1813 (2004). Somehow, that
alleged effect does not seem to justify six thousand deaths per year. Moreover, why paying
organ donors would have this effect while paying physicians does not is not explained.
12. In addition, some of these arguments reflect a fundamental ignorance or misunderstand-
ing of established economic principles. See David Kaserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and
Misconceptions, 18 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 567 (2002).
13. The American Medical Association's (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs ap-
pears to recognize the need to incorporate costs and benefits in the ethical evaluation of alterna-
tive policy proposals. See their June 2002 Statement approving trials of financial incentives,
endorsed by the AMA House of Delegates. Also, Thomas Peter's proposal to base policy
choices on the number of lives saved is consistent with a cost-benefit criterion if lives are as-
signed a sufficiently large value. See Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in
Cadaveric Organ Donation, 265 JAMA 1302 (1991).
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the ethical objections to donor payments, the cost-benefit calculations
assume heightened importance.
II. ETHICAL (AND OTHER) ARGUMENTS
AGAINST DONOR PAYMENTS
Over the years, a number of arguments presented ostensibly have
provided a basis for maintaining the traditional organ procurement
policy of altruistic-only (i.e., zero price) donations, despite the policy's
demonstrated inability to provide an adequate supply of transplant-
able organs. 14 At one point or another, all of these arguments (with,
perhaps, one exception) 15 have been thoroughly and convincingly re-
butted in the published literature on this subject. 16 Nonetheless, like
weeds in a garden, these arguments continue to sprout in the ongoing
debate and indeed recently succeeded in forestalling federal legisla-
tive action that would have enabled limited trials designed to gauge
empirically the impact of financial incentives on cadaveric organ sup-
ply. 17 Specifically, two bills-one in the House and one in the Sen-
ate-were killed in committee by opponents of financial incentives.
Consequently, it appears continuously necessary to point out the
rather glaring weaknesses of these objections to donor payments.
Accordingly, in this section, we briefly rebut some of the most com-
mon arguments raised by opponents of financial incentives. Our
treatment of these arguments will be neither thorough nor exhaustive.
As noted above, a more complete and compelling criticism of each
can be found in the prior literature.18 Our objective here is simply to
survey the most common arguments and illustrate the extraordinarily
poor quality of our opponents' objections.
A. Accessibility of Transplants to the Poor
One of the early arguments adopted by opponents of financial in-
centives is that if organs are purchased from donors at a positive price,
14. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 3, at 54-69.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52 and Part IV.
16. See, e.g., Blair & Kaserman, supra note 5; Cohen, supra note 5; Gerald Dworkin, Markets
and Morals: The Case for Organ Sales, 60 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 66 (1993); Henry Hansmann,
The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 57
(1989); Radcliffe Richards, supra note 10; Janet Radcliffe-Richards et al., The Case for Allowing
Kidney Sales, 351 LANCET 1950 (1998).
17. Francis L. Delmonico, Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, MEDSCAPE TRANSPLAN-
TATION, Jan. 7, 2004, available at www.medscape.com/viewarticle/456739.
18. See supra note 16.
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they in turn must be sold to recipients at a positive price. 19 As a con-
sequence of such resale (and implicitly assuming that the latter price
would be high), only wealthy individuals would be able to afford
transplants. Poorer people allegedly would be priced out of the trans-
plant market by the added cost of donor payments. 20
The most obvious fallacy of this argument is that it fails to distin-
guish between the use of money to acquire organs from donors and
the use of money to allocate organs to waiting recipients. Obviously,
the price system can be used for both, but its use for one does not
necessitate its use for the other. Consequently, financial incentives
can be incorporated readily within the current system without any al-
teration in the manner through which transplantable organs are dis-
tributed to patients. The only difference would be that more organs
would become available for distribution. Because many of the pa-
tients on the waiting lists are poor, they would benefit greatly from the
use of financial incentives.
Also, it is worth pointing out that without third-party payment (pri-
marily by the federal government), poor people could not afford
transplants today. The average cost of a transplant runs from approxi-
mately $100,000 for a kidney transplant to well over $250,000 for a
liver transplant.21 The additional cost of donor payments would not
add a significant amount to these figures. Indeed, it is even possible
that the increased efficiency of the overall organ procurement process
would lower transplant costs. 22 Moreover, kidney transplantation is a
far less costly treatment modality for renal failure than dialysis. Thus,
the federal government's End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program
saves thousands of dollars annually for each successful kidney trans-
plant performed.23 As a result, the net cost of instituting donor pay-
19. Laura A. Siminoff & Matthew D. Leonard, Financial Incentives: Alternatives to the Altruis-
tic Model of Organ Donation, 9 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 250, 253 (1999).
20. Id.
21. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 3.
22. That is, it may be more efficient (i.e., less costly) to pay cadaveric organ donors than it
currently is to convince them to give away a valuable asset (an organ) for free. Evans reports
median charges for organ acquisition costs of $12,290 for a kidney, $12,578 for a heart, and
$16,281 for a liver. Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial
Incentives, 269 JAMA 3113, 3113 (1993). A portion of these charges covers the organ procure-
ment organizations' public and professional educational programs and the costs of conducting
direct negotiations with families of potential donors. Id.
23. That program, established in 1972, covers the costs of both dialysis and transplantation for
all U.S. citizens suffering renal failure. Jeffrey M. Prottas, The Structure and Effectiveness of the
U.S. Organ Procurement System, 22 INQUIRY 365 (1985). We incorporate these cost savings later
in our empirical analysis.
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ments is likely to be negative. There would be no need to impose any
additional costs on transplant recipients.
B. Economic Coercion of the Poor
A second argument employed by opponents of financial incentives
is that families of the recently deceased may be economically coerced
into supplying their relatives' organs when their fundamental religious
or moral beliefs would have otherwise prevented them from doing
so. 24 This argument contains several rather blatant weaknesses. First,
it is obviously paternalistic in nature. In preventing donor payments,
the ethicist substitutes his or her own values for those of the individu-
als directly involved in the exchange. Market prices provide incen-
tives that induce us to do many things we would not otherwise do. We
usually view such payments as a reward for our efforts, not as some-
thing that coerces us to act. As with any other market exchange, the
inducement provided by donor payments is the financial gain offered
by the organ procurement agency in return for the voluntary agree-
ment to supply organs. The purchasing agent uses no threats or nega-
tive sanctions to induce agreement. As a result, no coercion, in the
normal sense of the term, is used.25 Moreover, as previous authors
have noted, applying this reasoning would lead to an ironic result.26
Those advancing the economic coercion argument are ostensibly try-
ing to help the economically disadvantaged by preventing them from
being coerced. But prohibiting compensation for organ donation ac-
tually exacerbates their poverty by denying them payment for the or-
gans they provide.27
The sheer nonsense of this argument becomes even more apparent
when we consider its policy implications. If one really believes that
financial incentives are coercive to low income families and wants to
prevent that coercion, a policy that allows donor payments only to
families above a certain income level could be instituted. The poor
could still donate organs but would not be allowed to receive any
24. See Radcliffe Richards, supra note 10, for a more complete rebuttal of this argument.
25. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 217 (6th ed. 1977) provides the following defi-
nitions of "coerce": "1: to restrain or dominate by nullifying individual will 2: to compel to an
act or choice.., they could - the citizens by threats but not persuade their agreement... 3: to
enforce or bring about by force or threat." A voluntary transaction between two willing parties
clearly does not qualify as coercion under any of these definitions.
26. Radcliffe Richards, supra note 10, at 382.
27. This point was emphasized by Radcliffe Richards: "Our indignation on behalf of the ex-
ploited poor seems to take the curious form of wanting to make them worse off still." Id. at 377.
Later, she wrote: "[P]revention of sales, in itself, only closes a miserable range of options still
further. To the coercion of poverty is added the coercion of the supposed protector .... " Id. at
382.
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compensation, while higher income donors would be paid. But any-
one advocating such a policy will unlikely be seen as a champion of
the poor.
Finally, if we are going to base our selection of policy options on the
sole criterion of the degree of coercion involved, then we must look at
the use of financial incentives not in isolation, but in comparison with
our current system. Donor payments would create a mechanism for
voluntary exchanges at mutually agreeable prices. Under the current
system, however, a physician, nurse, or organ procurement official
must try to coax the family of the deceased into giving away an asset
that could be worth several thousand dollars. Which system involves
greater coercion? By favoring the current system over financial incen-
tives, the proponent is merely choosing moral or emotional coercion
over the alleged economic coercion that would accompany donor
payments.28
C. Premature Termination of Care
Another popular argument advanced by opponents of financial in-
centives is that the presence of such incentives might result in unwar-
ranted removal of care for critically injured patients in order to collect
donor payments.29 This argument has at least two serious shortcom-
ings. First, financial incentives are paid to the families of the de-
ceased, not the attending physician. Thus, the donor's family is the
only entity that stands to gain financially from the donor's death. The
physician responsible for the patient's care has no more incentive to
withhold or terminate treatment for a potential organ donor than for
any other patient. The existence of donor payments, then, is very sim-
ilar to a will. It yields benefits to someone from the patient's death,
but no benefits accrue to the physician responsible for the patient's
care. If society allows wills, it should not oppose financial incentives
on these grounds.
Second, this argument implicitly assumes that the magnitude of do-
nor payments will be sufficiently large to induce family members to
pull the plug prematurely on their relatives. Economic reasoning and
some limited empirical evidence, however, suggest that the size of the
financial incentive required to eliminate the organ shortage is rather
28. The current system fosters an undesirable atmosphere of emotional coercion within poten-
tial recipients' families. Living related donors may agree to donate only under intense pressure
from family members. As a result, the decreased reliance on living donors that would accom-
pany the use of financial incentives would reduce the amount of coercion from this source.
29. See Delmonico, supra note 11.
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modest-probably on the order of $1,000 to $5,000 per donor.30 The
price per organ, then, may well fall below $1,000. This expectation of
a relatively low market-clearing price is supported by the economic
conditions that characterize the potential supply of cadaveric organs.
For example, there is currently a large amount of "excess capacity"-
only a small portion (one-third to one-half) of all potential cadaveric
organs is collected.31 In addition, the opportunity cost of supplying
those extra organs is quite small because the "next best alternative
use" is burial. Together, these considerations suggest that the price
elasticity of the supply of cadaveric organs is likely to be large and the
equilibrium level of donor payments is therefore likely to be corre-
spondingly low. If that is the case, the incentive to terminate care
prematurely will also be low-certainly much less than that associated
with most wills. Thus, the premature termination of care argument is
a red herring.
D. Black Market Sales
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of financial incen-
tives have claimed that the legalization of donor payments would
somehow result in an increase in the black market trade in organs. 32
Exactly how this alleged effect would occur has not been explained.
This particular allegation reveals the general lack of understanding of
market forces held by some of the parties that, unfortunately, are in-
fluencing public policy in this area.
As anyone with the most rudimentary knowledge of economics rec-
ognizes, black market activity is a direct consequence of shortages and
the market-price constraints that typically cause them. It is only when
legal trade at market-determined prices is prohibited that illegal trade
arises. The restriction in the quantity of a good supplied that is neces-
sarily caused by the suppression of price below its equilibrium level
pushes upward the illegal price that some demanders are willing to
pay, particularly for products, like organs, that exhibit a low price
elasticity of demand. The result is the creation of artificially large
30. Adams, Barnett, and Kaserman provide some rough estimates of the level of compensa-
tion required to clear organ markets. Their results suggest market-clearing prices of $135 to
$1,509 per donor. A. Frank Adams III et al., Markets for Organs: The Question of Supply, 17
CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 147, 154 (1999).
31. See generally Kaserman, supra note 12.
32. Siminoff and Mercer wrote: "Finally, [financial incentives] may lead to a black market for
organs." Laura A. Siminoff & Mary Beth Mercer, Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Consent
for Organ Donation, 10 CAMBRIDGE 0. HEALTHCARE ETHics 377 (2001).
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profit opportunities for those suppliers willing to violate the legal
price restraint. 33
From drugs to prostitution to alcohol prohibition, the cure for black
market sales is the removal of the legal price constraint. 34 Where le-
gal trade is permitted and the price is allowed to rise to its market-
clearing level, shortages-and, concomitantly, the profitability of
black market activity-disappear. Consequently, to argue that donor
payments will contribute to black market trade in organs is a complete
perversion of the well-established economic logic of how markets op-
erate. Indeed, if one is opposed to black market sales, then, absent
other sources of opposition, one should vigorously support the use of
financial incentives.
E. The "Slippery Slope"
Yet another argument raised by opponents of financial incentives is
that paying donors of cadaveric organs creates a so-called "slippery
slope" that may ultimately lead to payments for living donors as
well. 35 Opposition to the latter, then, is seen as a justification for op-
position to the former. This line of reasoning exhibits several obvious
shortcomings.
For one thing, it presupposes that paying living donors is ethically
unacceptable. But that proposition has itself been subject to consider-
able debate.36 One must ask: If it is ethical to use living donors at all,
why is it unethical to compensate them financially for their inconve-
nience, pain, and risk of immediate and future complications? While
the medical risks of donating a kidney may be low, they are certainly
not zero.
Fortunately, however, we do not need to settle this issue to rebut
the slippery slope argument. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument
and contrary to what some ethicists have concluded, that it is unethi-
cal to pay living donors. Does it then follow that we should also op-
pose the use of financial incentives for cadaveric donors? At least
three considerations suggest that we should not.
First, to the extent one is opposed to the use of living donors-
either paid or unpaid-one should favor financial incentives for ca-
33. See KASERMAN & BARNETr, supra note 3, at 21-23.
34. This is not to say that all such sales should necessarily be legalized. The point is simply
that legalization of trade removes the incentives for black market activities.
35. Delmonico wrote that "[t]hose who oppose financial incentives for deceased donation as-
sert a slippery slope to the subsequent development of payment for live donor organs." Del-
monico, supra note 17.
36. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 16.
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daveric donors. The reason for this is straightforward. Our current,
heavy reliance on living donors is, to a large degree, a symptom of the
severity of the shortage of cadaveric organs. As that shortage is re-
duced and ultimately eliminated by implementation of donor pay-
ments, the need for living donors will begin to subside. 37 Along with
the reduction in the demand for living donors will come a reduced
incentive to employ payments to induce an increase in the quantity of
organs supplied from that source. Therefore, if anything, the employ-
ment of financial incentives for cadaveric organs will actually decrease
the growing pressure to pay living donors. Thus, the slippery slope
argument is a non sequitur.
Second, it must be recognized that living donors are, in many in-
stances, already paid today. Both overtly in black market transactions
and covertly in under-the-table payments, donor payments are, with-
out question, currently used to encourage living donors to come for-
ward. 38 Indeed, a recent innovation (that ironically receives the
approval of perhaps the most ardent opponent of financial incentives)
is living donor kidney exchanges.39 In such exchanges, a member of
one family, A, agrees to donate a kidney to a member of another fam-
ily, B, on the condition that a member of family B simultaneously do-
nates a kidney to family A.40 Obviously, such an agreement
constitutes a market exchange through barter, with kidneys used as
the medium of exchange. Payment occurs, but without the use of
money. Just why such nonmonetary payments are ethical, but money
is not, is far from obvious.
Finally, the slippery slope argument ignores the obvious ability of
public policy to legalize the use of financial incentives for cadaveric
organs while maintaining the ban on living donor payments. The al-
leged domino effect from one to the other is not a necessary outcome
and can easily be prevented if so desired. There is no reason to sacri-
fice over 6,000 lives each year in a misguided attempt to avoid some-
37. Due to significantly higher success rates with living donor kidneys-particularly in the
longer term-it is unlikely that all living donations will be replaced with cadaver kidneys, even if
the shortage is eliminated completely. Nonetheless, it is certain that a reduction in the shortage
of cadaveric donors will lower the demand for living donors.
38. Alan R. Hull, Can We Go Beyond Altruism . . . Without Destroying It?, TRANSPLANT
NEWS & ISSUES, Oct. 2002, at S7 (writing that "talking to many colleagues at the Transplant
Congress, many had anecdotes about where payment appeared to have been made. When it was
'in the family,' maybe there was nothing we could do. Now, it has moved outside the immediate
family to 'distant relatives' or totally unrelated living donors.").
39. See Delmonico, supra note 17.
40. The motivation for this sort of exchange is an incompatibility between the potential donor
and recipient within each family.
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thing that can readily be proscribed and, in any event, is not likely to
happen.
F. Organ Quality
A nonethical argument that has been raised to oppose the use of
donor payments involves the potential effect of such payments on the
quality of the cadaveric organs harvested.41 It has been argued that
the alleged negative impact could occur through two separate ways.
First, substituting payments for altruism may reduce the relative
(though not necessarily the absolute) number of organs obtained from
comparatively higher income individuals.42 To the extent that a posi-
tive correlation exists between health and income, adopting a system
of financial incentives may lower the average quality of the organs
obtained for transplantation. Second, the prospect of receiving pay-
ment for organ donation may induce surviving family members to mis-
represent or conceal known facts about the deceased's medical history
or condition. 43 Therefore, opponents of financial incentives have ar-
gued that it is necessary to maintain the current, altruistic procure-
ment system in order to ensure the high quality of the organs
obtained.
At least three considerations suggest that this argument is incorrect
or greatly overstated. First, it is not at all certain that the presumed
decline in quality will materialize. In fact, it appears more likely that
quality would actually improve with donor payments. Under current,
increasingly severe shortage conditions, transplant centers have been
forced to make use of more marginal or even substandard organs. 44
The trend toward reliance upon older and, on occasion, diseased or-
gans has accelerated in recent years as patients' desperation has
grown.45 The greater number of organs that would become available
41. See generally Delmonico, supra note 11. See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability
and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985) (raising quality control as a
potential justification for modified inalienibility, which allows donations but does not permit
sales).
42. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. Lisa E. Douglass, Organ Donation, Procurement and Transplantation: The Process, the
Problems, the Law, 65 UMKC L. REV. 201, 202 (1996) (writing that "[w]hile in a majority of
cases the donated organ truly is the 'gift of life,' many recipients have been transplanted with
deadly organs resulting from pitfalls in the organ donation process. By 1993, 6,798 patients were
documented as recipients of cancerous organs, and it is estimated that the cancer incidence in
patients who undergo transplantation ranges from 4% to 18%."). According to Douglass, this
problem is attributable to both the desperation caused by the shortage and the "good faith"
indemnification from liability for organ procurement organizations provided by law. Id.
45. Paul Engstrom, Damaged Goods, WASH. POST, June 26, 2001, at 8.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
with the implementation of financial incentives, however, would en-
able physicians to exercise more selectivity in screening acceptable or-
gans for transplantation. Organ quantity and quality are not
independent variables.46
Second, transplant centers or organ procurement organizations-ei-
ther public or private-are generally able to assess organ quality prior
to transplantation, regardless of any representations made by surviv-
ing family members. Organs from cadavers can be tested and ex-
amined. As a result, comparisons to the blood market and the
incidence of infection from purchased sources are not applicable. For
cadaveric organs, the potential donor pool is the set of accident and
stroke victims. Financial incentives to donate will not increase the
number of potential donors or alter in any way the incidence of dis-
ease or drug use among this set of individuals. Consequently, even a
potential decrement in the average quality of organs collected need
not lead to a decrement in the average quality of organs transplanted.
Transplant centers can establish quality control protocols and adjust
donor payments to yield an adequate supply of organs that meet the
established standards.
Finally, to the extent that one is truly concerned that financial in-
centives will induce surviving family members to misrepresent the
health or medical history of potential organ donors, legal liability rules
with substantial sanctions can be implemented to discourage such con-
duct. Indeed, it has been argued convincingly that it is the absence of
such rules (in fact, an explicit exemption from legal liability) that
caused the quality problems encountered with purchased blood.47
Again, if a potential problem with donor payments exists, it is far
more sensible and compassionate to address that problem directly
rather than continue to sacrifice thousands of lives annually in an ef-
fort to avoid a feared effect that is unlikely to arise anyway.
G. "Commodification" of the Human Body
The final ethical argument against the use of financial incentives to
increase the quantity of cadaveric organs supplied involves a concern
that allowing money to influence the decision to donate will serve to
46. Id. (quoting Jimmy Light, Director of Transplant Services at Washington Hospital Center,
as stating: "One way to shorten the wait is to trade off donor quality").
47. See Clark C. Havighurst, Legal Responses to the Problem of Poor-Quality Blood, in
BLOOD POLICY: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 21 (1977); Reuben A. Kessel, Transfused Blood,
Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem, 17 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1974). See also KASERMAN &
BARNETr, supra note 3, at app. 4a (containing a review of the literature pertaining to blood sales
and an evaluation of its relevance to organ markets).
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"commodify" the human body and thus cheapen human dignity and
the concept of self.48 While the acceptance of payment for the agree-
ment to donate is certainly voluntary for the parties directly involved,
the exchange itself is thought to denigrate the sanctity or value of the
human body for others who are not direct participants in the transac-
tion. In economic terms, a negative externality is believed to be asso-
ciated with donor payments, and (implicitly) these third-party effects
are assumed to dominate the direct benefits attributable to the
exchanges. 49
There are at least four counterarguments to the commodification
concern. First, public opinion surveys suggest that, among the general
population, the alleged negative attitude toward donor payments is
greatly exaggerated. 50 Concern regarding this issue appears to be con-
siderably more prevalent-though far from universal-among medi-
cal professionals.51 We suspect that exposure to this argument over
the years has sensitized them to the issue. Nonetheless, the empirical
evidence indicates that the alleged effect, while present among a small
subset of the population, is far less important than opponents of finan-
cial incentives presume. 52
Second, if we are going to consider third-party effects stemming
from donor payments, we should incorporate all such effects in the
analysis. If, as is almost certainly the case, financial incentives succeed
in increasing the number of cadaveric organs supplied, there will be
tremendous third-party benefits realized by the families of the recipi-
ents whose lives are saved by the transplants that otherwise would not
have occurred. The lives currently lost because of the organ shortage
have an extremely large value to their relatives and others who are
not directly involved in the transaction. This large positive externality
48. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 97 (1996).
49. EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 6, at 439 (providing the following definition of an ex-
ternality: "Benefits or costs of an individual's activity that the individual does not receive or
bear"). Further, the two authors stated that "[e]xternalities arise when one person's activities
affect the well-being of others, either positively or negatively." Id. at 440.
50. See, e.g., J.D. Jasper et al., The Public's Attitudes Toward Incentives for Organ Donation,
31 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2181 (1999); Christian Williams, Combatting the Problems of
Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed Donative Consent, 26
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315 (1994).
51. See J.D. Jasper et al., Altruism, Incentives, and Organ Donation: Attitudes of the Transplant
Community, 42 MED. CARE 378 (2004).
52. Adams et al., supra note 30, at 153 (reporting that only twelve percent of the people
surveyed indicated that they would be offended by the implementation of financial incentives for
cadaveric organ donors; less than a third of those respondents (less than four percent of the
entire sample) indicated that they would be so offended that they would refuse to supply the
organs at all).
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seems likely to overwhelm any negative externality stemming from
the so-called comodification effect.
Third, as is the case with most new public policies or practices, pub-
lic attitudes toward donor payments are likely to evolve rapidly with
experience. Indeed, once financial incentives become routine, fami-
lies of accident or stroke victims will come to expect compensation
from organ collection agencies. As this occurs, organ procurement
personnel are likely to find their task easier, as the practice becomes
the norm and is ingrained in the collection process. Moreover, such
payments need not drive out altruism. Uncompensated donation can
remain an option, and the personal satisfaction that the donation deci-
sion will greatly benefit recipients-even where payment is received-
will remain valid.5 3 Thus, socialization of donor payments over time
will likely reduce or even eliminate any concerns associated with the
commodification issue.
Finally, and importantly, from an economic perspective, if the al-
leged negative externality associated with commodification of the
human body justifies continuing the ban on financial incentives, it is
necessary that the value of these third-party effects dominates the di-
rect social benefits realized from the use of such incentives. As a re-
sult, one cannot appeal to the commodification argument as a
justification for that ban in isolation without knowing the magnitude
of those direct benefits. This is simply to say that a truly ethical choice
cannot ignore the consequences of that choice. Thus, some reckoning
of the social value of the lives likely to be saved by donor payments-
or, conversely, the lives lost as a result of the ban on such payments-
needs to be made. We undertake that reckoning in the following sec-
tion of this Article.
III. A COST-BENEFIT PERSPECTIVE
The current ban on compensation for cadaveric organ donation pro-
duces effects of several different sorts. First, and most obviously, it
leads to early deaths of patients who cannot obtain transplants. In
addition, those patients who do not die require continuous and costly
treatment. Also, when living donation is possible, family members un-
dergo costly and invasive medical procedures to provide suitable or-
gans for loved ones. These examples of death and suffering must be
included in the social costs of the current system.
53. Dworkin, supra note 16, at 69 ("It is clear, however, that the presence of markets does not
generally drive out altruistic motives."). He points out that evidence from the blood market is
inconclusive on this issue. Id. at 68-69
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While one may argue that cherished principles that prohibit corn-
modification of the human body are simply beyond price, the achieve-
ment of these principles do have costs. These costs often involve the
violation of other equally cherished principles. Be that as it may, it is
necessary for any useful evaluation of our current organ procurement
regime to account, if only in a speculative fashion, for the costs that
regime imposes. This speculative accounting is the purpose of this
section.
Our goal here is modest. We seek only to evaluate, to orders of
magnitude, the probable costs of the current ban on donor compensa-
tion in the United States. We find that very conservative estimates of
these costs indicate losses of billions of dollars each year. We find
further that our estimates are not inconsistent with other analyses that
focus more narrowly on direct cost savings from transplantation for
government programs such as Medicare.
Because kidney grafts for ESRD patients represent by far the most
severe case of organ rationing, our model will concentrate on this pro-
cedure. A cadaveric donor, however, is typically capable of providing
multiple organs for transplantation, so the waiting lists for various
types of transplants are closely related in the sense that an increase in
cadaveric donation would reduce all such lists, though not necessarily
in equal proportions. While our focus here will be on kidneys, we
later extend our argument to several other organs. In every case, we
utilize assumptions that tend to cause us to understate the benefits of a
policy that allows donor payments.
We begin by specifying a simple dynamic model of the evolution of
the waiting list for kidney grafts in the United States. Data from the
Organ Procurement and Transplant Network (OPTN) for the years
1995-2002 was used to estimate statistically model parameters and
calibrate our resulting simulations. We were then able to generate es-
timates of the numbers and types of donors, waiting list deaths, and
transplants performed under both a baseline, "no change" policy sce-
nario, and a donor-payment-based reform aimed at (the very modest
and, we believe, easily achievable goal of) stabilizing the kidney graft
waiting list. Cost savings attributable to changes in transplants per-
formed and waiting list deaths were then applied to our results to ob-
tain a partial and conservative economic assessment of such a
procurement reform.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The following model underlies our approach. The change in the
waiting list for kidneys (patients, not registrations) from years t-1 to t,
AWL, is (Equation 1):
AWL, = (a + A*t) - D,- A'C - L, + e,,where:
" (a + A • t) represents an exogenous, time-driven process that gen-
erates additional wait-listed ESRD patients;
" t is time;
" a and A are unknown parameters (the parameters a and A were
estimated by least squares, correcting for (mild) autocorrelation
in the series AWL1);
" D, is waiting list deaths in t;
* A is the ratio of usable kidney donations to cadavers (the propor-
tion A was taken to be 1.47, where this figure was based upon
observed values of A reported for the years 2000, 2001, and 2002,
by OPTN (which are 1.45, 1.46, and 1.47, respectively));
* Ct is cadaveric donors in t;
" L, is live kidney donations in t; and
" et is a random, zero-mean disturbance.
TABLE 1
OPTN DATA-1995-2002
Wait List Wait List Donors
Year Patients Deaths Cadavers Donors Living
1995 29,050 1,533 5,003 3,382
1996 32,310 1,851 5,038 3,656
19971 35,585 2,061 5,083 3,922
1998 38,772 2,444 5,338 4,396
1999 41,292 3,271 5,386 4,664
2000 44,719 3,040 5,490 5,422
2001 47,830 3,209 5,528 6,001
2002 50,855 3,396 5,630 6,236
Given these estimates, we turn next to our simulations. The model
given by Equation 1 allowed us to simulate the effects of hypothetical
changes in the number of cadaveric donors on transplants, given some
assumptions on the associated and probable responses in the rates of
both live donation and death. Because we seek to make a one-year
forecast only, we simplified our problem somewhat and adopted an
approach consistent with the very limited data available.
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TABLE 2
KIDNEY WAIT LIST SIMULATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
AWLI + D, + (1.47)C, + L
Variable Name Coefficient t
a constant 15,646 122.9
A time trend 772 25
Note:
* R2 = 0.989
" DW = 1.895
* Estimation corrected for first-order autocorrelation
" AWL = change in wait list patient census from t-1 to t
D = wait list deaths
" Ct = cadavers
" L, = live donations at t
" All calculations performed by SAS
First, we note that the number of living donors is nearly constant as
a proportion of the waiting list across the sample period. Specifically,
kidney donations from living donors vary from a low of 0.110 of the
waiting list (in 1997) to a high of 0.125 of the number of wait-listed
patients (in 2001). This result is quite intuitive-such donations are
nearly always made by family members of ESRD patients and are,
therefore, proportional to the size of the waiting list. Thus, for simula-
tion purposes, we took the number of live donations in year t, Lt, to be
1, = (0.12)WLt, where WLt is the waiting list patient count for kid-
neys in year t.
By similar reasoning, we find near sample-period constancy of the
number of transplanted kidneys per cadaveric donor. Each cadaver
yields 1.47 kidneys, on average, and this rate exhibits relatively little
variation-a sample maximum (in 1995) of 1.52 and a minimum of
1.45 (in 2000).54 Thus, we took A = 1.47 for our simulation.
Deaths of patients on the waiting list may also be taken to be pro-
portional to the wait list count over short time periods. Although ob-
served death rates have been rising historically as the backlog of
patients has increased, the rate of change is slow, with a rise from
about 5.3% per annum (in 1995) to about 6.7% in 2002. Thus, in what
follows, D, = (0.067)WLt. All three of the above assumptions appear
warranted by the short (one-year) forecast period adopted in the sim-
ulations below.
54. Some cadavers provide only one usable kidney and some kidneys are spoiled or cancer-
ous, while several hundred are taken annually for research purposes. See Organ Procurement
and Transplant Network, Donor Recovered in the U.S. by Donor Type, www.optn.org/page (last
visited Jan. 12, 2006).
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Cadaveric donations exhibit no simple relationship with waiting list
size because accidents or strokes are the primary sources of suitable
cadavers. Rather, those donations, as a percentage of waiting list
count, have steadily and substantially declined over many years.
While there were approximately seventeen percent as many cadaveric
donors as wait-listed ESRD patients in 1995, by 2002 the percentage
had fallen to eleven percent. As waiting lists continue to grow, histor-
ical evidence strongly suggests that this proportion will drop even fur-
ther, casting great doubt on the future viability of current policies.
Thus, it is necessary to forecast cadaveric donations "one period
ahead," although the monotonic behavior of this series presents no
serious technical complications. For our purpose, it was sufficient to
use the simple model (Equation 2):
C, = b + B . t + et
to estimate parameters b and B, where t is the time variable, and et is
a disturbance. This simple model was used to generate forecasts for
our baseline projection only, which assumes no change in the current
procurement policy. Table 3 gives the relevant statistical results.
Again, the overall fit is quite good.
TABLE 3
TIME TREND FORECAST OF CADAVERS DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: CADAVERS FOR TRANSPLANTATION
Variable Name Coefficient t
b constant 4,974 143.5
B time trend 97 11.6
Note:
*R = 0.95
* DW = 1.80
* Estimation by SAS
* Table 3 presents statistical results describing the "best" (in a statistical
sense) forecasting formula for predicting the number of available cadavers.
Given the relationship C = b + B - t + e,, we calculate that b = 4,974 and
B = 97 are the "best" estimates of these values.
We may now summarize the method we will use to evaluate some of
the costs of the current ban on cadaveric donor compensation. First,
our calculations will be based on Equation 1, supplemented by Equa-
tion 2, utilizing the regular empirical proportions that several of the
variables exhibit to WL1 . Specifically, we have (Equation 3):
AWL + (.067)WLt + (1.47)C, + (.12)WL, = 15,646 + (772) - t,
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where Ct = 4974 + (97)t in the case of no change in procurement
policy. C, equals an alternative value, to be defined later, if donor
compensation is introduced.
Given the above model, we are able to simulate two scenarios of
interest. Before turning to those simulations, however, we must first
emphasize that our data covers the 1995-2002 time period.55 Impor-
tantly, we are not trying to forecast the future evolution of the trans-
plant industry in the United States. Indeed, our "forecasts" will, in
one sense, refer to the past (2003). We merely wish to simulate, using
relatively recent values for transplant activity, the probable net effects
of introducing a very modest innovation in organ procurement. The
sole purpose of this exercise is to formulate reasonable, if somewhat
speculative, expectations of the economic consequences of introduc-
ing cadaveric donor compensation in comparison to an alternative ap-
proach of maintaining the current regime. Nothing else is implied.
Toward that end, we begin by considering the hypothetical baseline
case of no change in kidney procurement policy. We apply Equation 3
with a one-period-ahead (t = 8) forecast of the number of cadaveric
kidney donors of C8 = 4974 + 8 - 97 = 5,750. Using this scenario,
which corresponds fairly well to actual 2003 results, we find an in-
crease in wait-listed kidney patients to 54,106 (a gain of 3,251). This
forecast, in turn, yields 3,625 deaths, 8,452 cadaveric kidney grafts,
and 6,492 living donations. These results imply that a total of 14,944
kidney grafts would be performed with no change in policy. These
figures are closely in line with actual 2003 numbers.
We turn now to simulating the effect of introducing payments for
cadaveric donation. The current prohibition has resulted in a kidney
waiting list that exceeds 50,000 patients. It is not reasonable to expect
any compensation mechanism to eliminate such an enormous backlog
in a short period of time. Indeed, driving the waiting list to zero im-
mediately is patently impossible because an insufficient number of
deaths occur under medically suitable circumstances. 56 Thus, we eval-
uate a far more modest and realistic goal of simply eliminating further
growth in the waiting list.
We assume (we believe conservatively) that the introduction of
compensation for cadaveric donation is sufficient to cause no growth
in the queue for kidney grafts. Setting AWL = 0 in Equation 3, we
find that such a policy would require total cadaveric donations of
55. Less detailed but more recent data are available. See Organ Procurement and Transplant
Network, www.optn.org/data (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
56. See David L. Kaserman, On the Feasibility of Resolving the Organ Shortage, INQUIRY
(forthcoming Summer 2006).
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8,375-an increase of 2,625 donations (about forty-six percent) over
baseline levels. Since the waiting list does not grow, living donations
would be expected to fall from 6,492 to 6,102, reflecting the fact that
the levels of such donations are historically proportional to waiting list
size. Thus, the analysis includes a negative feedback from cadaveric to
living donation, although (conservatively) we assign no economic
value to this reduction in the number of living donors.
The procurement reform scenario then yields 18,413 total kidney
grafts and 3,407 deaths. Comparing this to the baseline model, we
observe a net increase in transplants of 3,469 and a reduction in deaths
of 218. We have not yet attempted to assign monetary "values" to
these outcomes in order to examine the magnitude of the economic
effects of the current ban on cadaveric donor compensation.
One may, of course, argue that the compensation ban serves some
invaluable principle and that the costs it imposes are therefore irrele-
vant. Such claims are ultimately beyond all argument. Nonetheless,
we disagree with them for reasons articulated previously. The saving
or repairing of lives, however, would seem to be an important value
that one must also consider. If it competes with these other values,
one must at least acknowledge the dimensions of the problem. In that
sense, one must bear the burden of claiming that hundreds of needless
deaths are an acceptable price to pay for the alleged moral returns of
the current regime.
Regardless of these philosophical issues, and perhaps despite them,
economics uses the observed actions of agents to infer the values they
implicitly place on their own lives and the lives of others. For exam-
ple, whenever someone takes an action that involves a small risk of
death, economists use the benefits the action conveys as a measure of
the economic cost the elevated risk of death imposes. This approach,
which is widely used in evaluating wages and occupational risks, pro-
duces estimates of the values of a "statistical" life. This technique is
widely used in economics to evaluate alternative policies that exhibit
different risks.57
Several problems arise when applying this logic to dialysis and
transplant patients. First, the risks associated with ESRD are vastly
greater than those associated with differential occupational risks on
which the analysis is typically based. Thus, while one can quite rea-
sonably evaluate the economic cost of a relatively tiny increase in job
risk, it is far less reasonable to ask someone to monetarily evaluate his
57. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB
RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY (1990).
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or her life. Second, as a consequence of this, the "value" of a statisti-
cal life obtained from such studies is quite low. This result, in turn,
suggests that any calculations based on such numbers will tend to un-
derstate (perhaps by a considerable amount) the costs of the existing
ban on donor compensation.
It is somewhat easier to evaluate direct money expenditures. Nu-
merous studies of healthcare costs for dialysis and transplant patients
have found substantial savings associated with transplants. 58 The
American Diabetes Association remarked that "[t]he long-term cost
savings of kidney transplantation over dialysis are well known. '59 In
2002, Fujisawa Healthcare, Inc. stated that "[t]he financial break-even
point for transplantation is reached only 2.7 years after a kidney graft.
Thus, transplantation is not only more advantageous than dialysis for
the patients' health and quality of life, but it is also more cost-effective
from a financial perspective. ' 60 Similarly, Eugene Schweitzer said in
1998, "[A]fter 2.7 years, the medical system saves about $27,000 per
year for each patient who has a transplant instead of remaining on
dialysis. ' 61 And finally, the National Kidney Foundation of the
United Kingdom found that "[a]ll solid organ transplantation ... is
cost effective" and that "kidney transplantation is very cost effective
"62
Because donor compensation will increase the number of trans-
plants performed, the additional costs of dialysis over transplantation
are a direct cost of the current system. As a result, some reasonable
estimates of these values are required for our calculations here.
In order to implement these calculations, we provisionally adopt the
following values. For lives saved, we utilize Phillip Held's "value of a
statistical life" figures, which are both detailed and organ-specific. 63
Held found that a kidney transplant that prevented a death created a
positive value of approximately $686,430 (in 2003 dollars), taking ac-
58. See, e.g., Eugene J. Schweitzer et al., The Shrinking Renal Replacement Therapy "Break-
Even" Point, 66 TRANSPLANTATION 1702 (1988).
59. Press Release, UK Transplant, Transplantation Cost Effectiveness (Dec. 7, 2003), available
at www.kidney.org.uk/campaigns/Transplantation/ukt-press-dec03.htm.
60. In April 2005, Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.,
Ltd. merged to form Astellas Pharma, Inc. See Astellas Pharma, US, Inc., www.us.astellas.com
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
61. Schweitzer et al., supra note 58. This paper was presented at the American Society of
Transplant Surgeons Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill. (May 1999).
62. Press Release, UK Transplant, supra note 59.
63. E-mail from Phillip Held, Professor, UC Berkeley, to T. Randolph Beard and David L.
Kaserman (Aug. 16, 2003 15:14 PM CST) (providing a powerpoint presentation prepared by his
class).
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count of relevant life expectancies. 64 This figure seems quite low.
Consequently, its use would tend to (perhaps severely) understate the
true values of lives saved. Nonetheless, we adopt it here.
Next, for the direct savings arising from reduced dialysis and related
costs, we use the 2003 figures provided by the National Kidney Foun-
dation of the United Kingdom. 65 Converting British pounds to dollars
at a rate of l£ = $1.80, we find a nine-year nominal savings from trans-
plantation of about $343,800 per patient.66 This number appears
reasonable.
We note that while these figures are very "soft," the methodology
adopted here facilitates calculations using any reasonable figures.
Our goal is only to provide rough estimates of the magnitudes in-
volved. We note also that we are ignoring several other relevant fac-
tors that, if considered, would tend to increase our estimates. First, we
make no allowance for "indirect" dialysis costs associated with time
spent in treatment, suffering, and so on. Second, we restrict our com-
putation to those savings that, while accruing over several years, arise
solely from actions occurring in a single year. Obviously, savings of
this sort may be compounded in subsequent years by continuing do-
nor compensation.
With the above caveats, we find savings arising from compensation
in a single year (hypothetically 2003) to be the sum of avoided dialysis
and related costs for 3,469 patients ($1,192,642,000) plus the value of
statistical lives saved for 218 avoided deaths ($149,548,000), for a total
value of $1,342,190,000. Again, this figure undoubtedly understates
the overall savings. Moreover, it is restricted to a very modest com-
pensation program that is applied in a single year solely to benefit
ESRD patients. Savings per additional kidney obtained, allowing for
a decline in live donation, equal about $387,000. And, given the kid-
ney yield per cadaver, each additional cadaveric donation saves about
$576,000 for kidneys alone.
These results are generally consistent with previous findings, al-
though our approach is new. J. Whiting's team found cost savings
from kidney grafts even for "Expanded Criterion Donors," regardless
of the poor matches and risk status of recipients.67
Finally, we do not offer this exercise as a precise calculation of the
overall social benefits likely to be realized from cadaveric donor pay-
64. Id.
65. See Press Release, UK Transplant, supra note 59.
66. Nine years is the current mean kidney graft survival time. See id.
67. J. Whiting et al., Economic Cost of Expanded Criteria Donors in Cadaveric Renal Trans-
plantation: Analysis of Medicare Payments, 70 TRANSPLANTATION 755 (2000).
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ments. Rather, these figures simply suggest that, even under very con-
servative assumptions, the costs-both direct and implied-of
banning both direct and implied donor compensation are enormous.
The case is further strengthened by noting that cadaveric organs are
jointly supplied, so any increase in cadaveric donation of kidneys will
automatically raise the availability of other organs. For example, the
observed ninety-six percent yield rate for liver grafts from cadavers
shows the policy discussed here could reduce the liver waiting list by
more than twenty percent in a single year. The observed yield of ca-
daveric transplantable hearts (ninety-five percent) suggests the wait-
ing list for hearts could be eliminated in a few years. Similar results
are obtained for other organs.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have examined the more popular "ethical" objec-
tions to the use of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation.
With a single possible exception, we have found the arguments sup-
porting these objections to be thoroughly unconvincing.68 They are
either logically flawed or founded upon what are, at heart, unan-
swered empirical questions. In some instances, they simply reflect a
fundamental misunderstanding of how market forces (supply and de-
mand) operate. As a result, it is important that public policy pertain-
ing to cadaveric organ procurement recognizes the illegitimacy of
these arguments.
The sole ethical objection that appears to make any sense whatso-
ever is the so-called "commodification" argument. Importantly, this
argument-that monetary transactions between cadaveric organ do-
nors and organ procurement organizations may offend the sensibilities
of third parties who are not participants in those transactions-is, in
essence, one of externalities. Taking this argument seriously, then, we
are able to apply the traditional cost-benefit methodology of econom-
ics to assess the conditions required for it to justify a continuation of
the ban on cadaveric donor payments. Using that methodology, we
demonstrate that the hypothesized negative externality would have to
attain what are, as a practical matter, unrealistically large values in
order for this argument to warrant such a ban. That is, it is simply
beyond comprehension that the current proscription on donor pay-
ments could possibly be supported by a comprehensive cost-benefit
68. A similar conclusion has been reached by several ethicists who have written in this area.
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 16; Radcliffe Richards, supra note 10; Radcliffe-Richards et al.,
supra note 16.
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evaluation, even one that assigns a large negative value to the so-
called commodification issue.
By continuing to forestall the adoption (or, indeed, even trials) of
this most promising solution to the organ shortage, the opponents of
financial incentives are effectively condemning thousands more pa-
tients to death each year. No matter how offended they are by the
prospect that families of recently deceased accident or stroke victims
might receive monetary compensation to encourage consent to re-
move their loved ones' organs, avoidance of their personal disutility
cannot possibly outweigh the value of the lives being lost. Perhaps it
is time for these self-anointed judges of what is ethical to check their
own moral compasses.
